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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 193

Accident time: 12:45

Accident Date: 25/07/1994

Where it occurred: Bok Kor mined area,
Kampot Province

Country: Cambodia

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Class: Victim inattention

Date of main report: 04/08/1994

ID original source: ERN/HV

Name of source: CMAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: sparse trees

Date record created: 14/02/2004

Date last modified: 14/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
vegetation clearance problem (?)

Accident report
An internal accident report was found on file at the country MAC in January 1999. Written by
an expatriate Technical Advisor and presented on 4th August 1994, the following summarises
its content.
The weather at the time of the accident was "sunny, clear, slight breeze and 85ºF". The victim
was walking along the Safe Lane carrying a radio and notebook and thinking when he walked
into a small tree. Two small trees (5cm stem thickness) blocked about 1/3 of the Safe Lane at
the place. He stumbled sideways and was not able to hold the tree for support. He placed his
foot "10-15"cm outside the Safe Lane and detonated a mine at 12:45. The Safe Lane marking
tape survived the blast.
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The victim had severe right foot injuries, some injuries to his right leg and a small cut on his
right arm. The victim's injury to his right foot later resulted in amputation of half his foot
including all of his toes.
The victim was given medical treatment, including the application of a tourniquet and a
"lactated drip". He was put into an ambulance at 13:00 and an injection of "pethidine"
administered. Ten minutes later the patient lost consciousness and his heart stopped. The
medic applied mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and cardiac massage and the patient recovered
for five minutes, then his heart and breathing stopped again. The medic resuscitated him
again and a third time before arrival at hospital. The victim was conscious on arrival at 13:45.
His first amputation was completed by 15:00.
The investigator examined the site and found fragmentation and a "large piece" of a PMN-2
three metres from the accident site. He calculated that the mine was 4cm from the safe lane
marking tape on its nearest side. Although the procedure was not written up, the demining
group's "accepted procedure" was to clear a full detector head width on either side of a Safe
Lane so that the tape could be safely positioned. This had not been done.

Conclusion
The investigator concluded that the mine was close enough to the edge of the Safe Lane to
have been found if normal procedures had been followed [by implication it might have been
missed using written procedures]. The victim's inattention was a contributory factor, as was
the presence of the trees in the Safe Lane [there was no written requirement for their
removal].

Recommendations
The investigator recommended that a verge of 10cm be cleared on either side of a Safe Lane;
that obstructions be removed when making Safe Lanes; that a day a month be put aside for
refresher training and to "review standard demining drills"; that "mine awareness courses" be
part of the training; that weekly Medevac training be expanded to cover all the demining
group's teams; and that a pocket sized manual of procedures should be prepared and
provided to all deminers.
These recommendations were commended by the Acting Director of the country MAC on 10th
August 1994 and action sanctioned. [Not done five years later in January 1999.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 246

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: US$2,500

Time to hospital: 1 hour

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
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COMMENT
Victim lost toes, then suffered surgical "salami" amputations to below the knee. See medical
report.

Medical report
A medical report recorded that one month after the first amputation the foot was swollen and
painful and the victim was moved to Preah Kosamak Hospital where he received 10 days of
drug treatment before the decision was made to amputate again 20cm below the knee.
Compensation of $1,620 was requested on 8th October 1994.
The victim acknowledged receipt of the sum of $1,620 on 10th October 1994.
Compensation was finally increased to a total of US$2,500 when the extent of amputation
became clear.
The victim's re-employment as a guard was proposed in a Khmer document dated 20th
February 1995.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because the victim stumbled
and stepped outside the clear area. This is an example of unavoidable human error which
must occasionally occur. The secondary cause is listed as “Victim inattention” because it
seems reasonable to assume that he was not paying attention when he stumbled.
However, he should have been safe to stumble and put a foot a little beyond the edge of the
safe lane if clearance had been done with the normally accepted overlap, so there was a
failure of field supervision.
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